veridical perception造句

例句与造句

1. Veridical perceptions and hallucinations are not members of a common class of mental states or events.
2. With many veridical perception from near death experience, I find evolution to have the same credibility as saying God created life.
3. Disjunctivists claim this because they hold that in veridical perception, a subject's experience actually presents the external, mind-independent object of that perception.
4. According to this theory, the only thing common to veridical perceptions and hallucinations is that in both cases, the subject cannot tell, via introspection, that he is not having a veridical perception.
5. According to this theory, the only thing common to veridical perceptions and hallucinations is that in both cases, the subject cannot tell, via introspection, that he is not having a veridical perception.
6. It's difficult to find veridical perception in a sentence. 用veridical perception造句挺难的
7. According to French ( 2005 ) a similar claim to the argument from veridical perceptions are the cases of Ring where he noted that, " as this kind of testimony builds, it seems more and more difficult to claim that the blind simply see what they report.
8. In this claim that a veridical perception and a non-veridical perception share no highest common factor, a theme is visible which runs throughout McDowell's work, namely, a commitment to seeing thoughts as essentially individuable only in their social and physical environment, so called externalism about the mental.
9. In this claim that a veridical perception and a non-veridical perception share no highest common factor, a theme is visible which runs throughout McDowell's work, namely, a commitment to seeing thoughts as essentially individuable only in their social and physical environment, so called externalism about the mental.
10. Third, the last part of the perceptual relativity version of the argument has been challenged by questioning whether there is really no experiential difference between veridical and non-veridical perception; and by arguing that even if sense-data are experienced in non-veridical cases and even if the difference between veridical and non-veridical cases is, as claimed, experientially indiscernible, there is still no reason to think that sense-data are the immediate objects of experience in veridical cases.